WITCHcraft: Efficient PGD attacks with random step size by Chiang, Ping-Yeh et al.
WITCHCRAFT: EFFICIENT PGD ATTACKS WITH RANDOM STEP SIZE
Tom Goldstein Renkun Ni Steven Reich Ali Shafahi
Ping-Yeh Chiang Jonas Geiping Micah Goldblum
University of Maryland, College Park
University of Siegen
ABSTRACT
State-of-the-art adversarial attacks on neural networks use
expensive iterative methods and numerous random restarts
from different initial points. Iterative FGSM-based methods
without restarts trade off performance for computational ef-
ficiency because they do not adequately explore the image
space and are highly sensitive to the choice of step size. We
propose a variant of Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) that
uses a random step size to improve performance without
resorting to expensive random restarts. Our method, Wide
Iterative Stochastic crafting (WITCHcraft), achieves results
superior to the classical PGD attack on the CIFAR-10 and
MNIST data sets but without additional computational cost.
This simple modification of PGD makes crafting attacks more
economical, which is important in situations like adversarial
training where attacks need to be crafted in real time.
Index Terms— Adversarial, Attack, PGD, CNN, CIFAR
1. INTRODUCTION
Neural networks trained using stochastic gradient descent
(SGD) are easily fooled by adversarial examples, small per-
turbations to inputs that change the output of the network
[1]. Adversarial attacks can expose serious security vulner-
abilities in real-world applications such as object detection
in self-driving cars [2] and classification in medical imaging
[3]. In response to this threat, subsequent work has devel-
oped training methods for producing neural networks robust
to these attacks [4, 5]. The back-and-forth between new de-
fenses and adversarial attacks that break them has spawned
an array of powerful new attack methods.
Among these, typical untargeted adversarial attacks oper-
ate by maximizing the loss of a neural network with respect
to image space, within a small ball surrounding the input,
using various optimization algorithms. Targeted attacks, on
the other hand, minimize loss on a particular incorrect label.
In the white-box attack setting, an attacker has access to the
parameters of the network, while black-box attacks operate
by querying the network or transferring attacks computed on
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Fig. 1. WITCHcraft perturbs a “person” image into the Im-
ageNet “tench” class (a kind of fish) using a targeted attack
without changing the apparent class to human observers. This
is an example of a “targeted” attack because the “tench” class
was chosen a-priori by the attacker. The images have been
blurred for anonymity.
other networks. We focus on the white-box setting, a space
which is dominated by optimization methods.
Input spaces in computer vision are high-dimensional,
and finding these small perturbations that effectively fool a
network requires non-convex optimization [6]. The outputs
of neural networks oscillate in these neighborhoods, so that
classical gradient descent is ineffective [7], and signed gradi-
ent descent methods [8] have better success. Even so, a single
gradient descent is not guaranteed to solve the problem, so
state-of-the-art attacks restart the attack many times with ran-
dom initialization to introduce randomness and aggressively
explore input space. However, this technique increases com-
putational cost which may render an adversary, dynamically
attacking a system in real time, useless. This is particularly
problematic for adversarial training, a process in which at-
tacks are generated on-the-fly during network training and
used to harden a network against attacks.
In this work, we develop a novel method, Wide Itera-
tive Stochastic crafting (WITCHcraft), for introducing ran-
domness into adversarial attacks without running the attack
multiple times with different initializations. We modify the
classical PGD attack, which is similar to the Basic Iterative
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Method with a random restart and projections, by using a
coordinate-wise random step size, meaning each entry of the
signed gradient is scaled by a random factor chosen uniformly
at random. We find that this randomization scheme decreases
sensitivity to the choice of the step size parameters and ini-
tialization. We compare our method to standard PGD attacks
and PGD with random restarts. We find that our method out-
performs both of these attacks on the CIFAR-10 and MNIST
data sets when granting all attackers equal compute budget.
In Figure 1, we see an example of WITCHcraft perturbing a
man into an ImageNet fish class without visibly changing the
class to human observers [9].
2. RELATED WORK
Szegedy et al. first demonstrated the existence of adversar-
ial examples comprising small perturbations of input pixels
[1]. Their regularized gradient descent method spawned nu-
merous subsequent attacks. These later attacks include a va-
riety of new objectives from universal adversarial perturba-
tions, in which a single perturbation is effective on most test
images, to realistic perturbations which are not sensitive to
certain transformations [10, 11]. Similarly, defense meth-
ods have sprung up to create networks robust to these attacks
[4, 12, 13]. The most successful of these defense methods,
adversarial training, involves exposing the network to adver-
sarial examples instead of clean examples during training [5].
Since the advent of these defenses, even more attack meth-
ods have emerged for defeating adversarially robust networks
[14, 15]. A recent result of this war between attacks and
defenses is the high computational cost of effective attacks
against adversarially trained models.
The foundation of most popular attack methods is the
PGD attack described by Madry et. al. [5]. Their version
of this attack starts with a randomly initialized perturbation
δ ∈ S, which is updated at each step via
δ ← ΠS [δ + τ sign(∇xL(x + δ, y))],
where τ is a fixed step size, x is the input, and y is the cor-
responding label. This method uses just the sign of the gradi-
ent, a strategy first adapted for attacks in [12]. The superiority
of signed gradients to raw gradients for producing adversar-
ial examples has puzzled the robustness community since its
discovery, but these strong fluctuations in the gradient signal
possibly help the attack to escape suboptimal solutions with
low gradient. Signed gradient descent methods are tightly in-
terconnected with adaptive gradient methods, such as Adam
[16] as discussed in [8].
In the aforementioned paper, Madry et al. demonstrate
that adversarial training against PGD results in a model that
is robust to norm-bounded attacks. Surprisingly, their exper-
iments (as well as later experiments by other authors [17])
show that even though their models are specifically trained
against PGD, models adversarially trained against the PGD
attacker are also robust against other attacks.
The current best reported (white-box) attack on the Madry
PGD-trained model is the multi-targeted attack described in
[18], which uses a targeted PGD attack (in which the attacker
chooses the label) on each incorrect class to find the best class
in which to perturb the clean input. This method exhibits nu-
merical results superior to previous methods but has the draw-
back of being highly computationally expensive as it both em-
ploys random restarts and scales linearly with the number of
classes. This makes it necessary to run the attack on massive
servers when training on large data sets with high-resolution
images, such as ImageNet or similar.
3. OUR ALGORITHM
In our work, we combine the PGD attack with a randomly
chosen coordinate-wise step size (See Algorithm 1). Effec-
tively, a random step size is chosen independently for each
entry in the gradient so that different pixels are perturbed dif-
ferent amounts with each iteration. WITCHcraft still incor-
porates a random initialization, which has been found to im-
prove results in previous work [5] and comes at no cost to
the attack scheme. We terminate the algorithm as soon as the
attack is successful at fooling the image classifier.
This strategy of perturbing the gradient signal randomly
can be understood as a specific form of stochastic precondi-
tioning of the actual PGD step, which leads to an increasing
exploratory power of the optimization scheme. Due to the
stochasticity, the algorithm does not easily stagnate or oscil-
late between two fixed points. As a result, the method avoids
getting trapped in local minima or cycles that inhibit progress.
Note that the step size in Algorithm 1 is a 2-dimensional
or 3-dimensional array of values (the same dimensions as the
image being crafted), as opposed to a single scalar value (as
is conventionally used for standard PGD attacks). The step
size array τ is multiplied into the gradient update using a
Hadamard (i.e., coordinate-wise) product, denoted . The
entries in the step size array are independent and identically
distributed and are chosen from uniform distribution on the
interval [0, 2a]. In our experiments, which appear below, we
compare this step size choice to a deterministic version with
step size a, which has an identical expected value to the ran-
domized version.
4. EXPERIMENTS
4.1. Comparison to PGD benchmarks
We test our method on the CIFAR-10 and MNIST data sets
against the WideResNet(34-10) model and CNN model with
two convolutional layers respectively, trained by the authors
of [5] using their 7-step PGD adversarial training algorithm
[19]. These robust models are canonical for testing attacks
Algorithm 1: The WITCHcraft attack algorithm.
Requires: Network f , input x, label y, permissible
perturbation set S, number of steps n, and expected
step size parameter a.
Initialize perturbation δ with entries distributed
independently according to distribution U(S).
for step = 1,..., n do
Sample τ with entries distributed independently
according to distribution U(0, 2a).
δ ← ΠS [δ + τ  sign(∇xL(x + δ, class)
If arg max(f(x + δ)) 6= y, return x + δ and
break.
and are used for competitive robustness leaderboards [20].
We focus on `∞ attacks, since this choice of norm domi-
nates the robustness literature. Perturbations on CIFAR-10
images are restricted to the `∞ ball with radius 0.031, while
for MNIST, attacks are restricted to the ball with radius 0.3.
Attack CIFAR-10 Aadv
20-step PGD 47.04%
20-step WITCHcraft 45.92%
100-step PGD 45.29%
100-step WITCHcraft 45.20%
20-PGD w/ 10 restarts 45.21%
Table 1. Robust accuracy, Aadv , of various adversarial
attacks against the WideResNet(34-10) model trained on
CIFAR-10, and released by the authors of [5]. Bolded
entries indicate best attack results across fixed computa-
tional complexity. Randomized coordinate-wise learning
rates (WITCHcraft) improve attack effectiveness with a fixed
computational budget.
Attack MNIST Aadv
100-step PGD 92.52%
100-step WITCHcraft 91.68%
500-step PGD 91.91%
500-step WITCHcraft 91.00%
Table 2. Robust accuracy, Aadv , of various adversarial at-
tacks against the two-layer CNN model trained on MNIST
and released by the authors of [5]. Bolded entries indicate
the best attack results across fixed computational complex-
ity. Like we observed for the CIFAR-10 model, randomized
coordinate-wise learning rates improve attack effectiveness
with a fixed computational budget.
WITCHcraft outperforms PGD with Madry’s choice of
hyperparameters and the same number of updates as shown
in Table 1 and Table 2. It is especially interesting to note
that WITCHcraft is able to continuously improve during the
attack iterations, whereas the standard PGD method quickly
saturates as shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5.
4.2. Exploring the effect of expected step size
Following up on this apparent success, we investigate the sen-
sitivity of PGD and WITCHcraft by comparing the expected
step size of our approach and the corresponding fixed step size
for PGD. The plot in Figure 2 shows that the standard PGD at-
tack can, in fact, be further enhanced over Madry’s results by
fine-tuning the step size. WITCHcraft shows some sensitivity
to expected step size but performs at least as well as standard
PGD except for very small values of hyperparameters, where
randomness seemingly has little to no effect on the optimiza-
tion. Of particular note is that the best overall reduction in
accuracy among these trials is achieved by WITCHcraft at an
expected step size of 3.
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Fig. 2. Sensitivity plot of a 40-step PGD attack compared
with 40-step WITCHcraft for the CIFAR-10 challenge. The
horizontal axis represents expected step size and the vertical
axis represents robust accuracy. We see that the randomized
step size choice in WITCHcraft out-performs a deterministic
step size choice, particularly when larger step sizes are used.
The advantage of WITCHcraft over a range of expected
step sizes is especially pronounced when attacking the diffi-
cult robust MNIST data, as Figure 3 shows. We note that in
this table, every value achieved by WITCHcraft surpasses any
achieved by PGD.
4.3. Exploring the benefits of additional attack steps
A third way to compare our method to PGD is to see how
quickly their success rates saturate as the number of attack
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Fig. 3. Sensitivity plot of a 40-PGD attack compared with 40-
step WITCHcraft, this time for the more well-studied MNIST
challenge. The horizontal axis represents expected step size
and the vertical axis represents robust accuracy. As we ob-
served above for CIFAR-10, we see that randomized step
sizes result in more effective attacks against robust MNIST
classifiers.
steps increase. Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the results of these
comparisons on CIFAR-10 and MNIST data, respectively.
We note that in both cases, WITCHcraft suffers less from
diminishing returns as the number of steps grows. We hy-
pothesize that this can be explained by the effect of random-
ness on exploration. The stochastic step size choice in the
WITCHcraft algorithm seems to better escape local minima.
The result is an algorithm that more aggressively explores the
space of permissible attack images than a standard PGD at-
tack with fixed step size.
5. DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we develop a method for introducing random-
ness into adversarial attacks without running the attack multi-
ple times at different initializations. This simple modification
of the popular PGD adversarial attack improves performance
on benchmark data sets against robust models, while avoid-
ing the high cost of conventional random restart methods. We
believe that attack algorithms that perform many sequential it-
erations in a deterministic fashion lose efficiency due to stag-
nating exploration, and the WITCHcraft algorithm seems to
supply a remedy for this problem.
We hope that the proposed method can increase the effi-
ciency of attack generation in situations like adversarial train-
ing, where attacks are crafted on-the-fly during training. A
reduction in the cost of crafting attacks has the potential to
make adversarial training more affordable on large industrial
problems. Future work may uncover new ways to introduce
randomness into attacks for increased efficiency.
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Fig. 4. Comparison of robust accuracy as we increase the
number of attack steps for WITCHcraft vs. PGD on CIFAR-
10. Each reported robust accuracy is an average of 8 trials.
As the number of steps increases, WITCHcraft outperforms
PGD by a progressively wider margin.
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Fig. 5. Comparison of robust accuracy as we increase the
number of attack steps for WITCHcraft vs. PGD on MNIST.
Each reported robust accuracy is an average of 6 trials. As the
number of steps increases, WITCHcraft outperforms PGD.
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